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1. Introduction
Formal reasoning about epistemic and doxastic notions in the 20th century can be traced back to Georg Henrik von
Wright’s An Essay in Modal Logic [30] and Hintikka’s Knowledge and Belief [16]. These books were written as attempts to
philosophically clarify our notions of knowledge and belief using modal logic. In the works of von Wright and Hintikka,
the ones believing or knowing – the agents – cannot change their beliefs, i.e. only static aspects of an agent’s beliefs can be
reasoned about. Alchourrón et al. presented a semiformal framework for reasoning about an agent’s changing beliefs [2] –
this constituted the prelude for the vast amount of research on belief revision done in the last two decades. Segerberg was
one of the ﬁrst to make these streams ﬂow together. In an array of papers (see, for example, [24,25,26]) he proposes and
develops a fully formal framework for reasoning about an agent’s changing beliefs: dynamic doxastic logic. Dynamic doxastic
logic is, as the name discerns, a blend of dynamic and doxastic logic. Inmore recent times, formal reasoning about knowledge
has been put to use in computer science, the standard references seem to be [15,18,29,14]. (The epithet epistemic is usually
used in computer science, whereas in philosophical logic one tends to distinguish between epistemic and doxastic. We will
henceforth use ‘epistemic’, except when referring to Segerberg’s logic.)
SinceKozenpublishedhis axiomatisationofKleenealgebra (an idempotent semiringwith theKleene star as a leastﬁxpoint
with respect to the canonical order) [19] and also showedhow to use an elaboration of it for program reasoning [20], there has
been signiﬁcant development and application of something that could be called semiring structures (some form of semiring
equipped with additional operators). The spirit in this development lies very much in the calculational prospect of abstract
algebra – tedious model-theoretic reasoning can be reduced to simple, perspicuous, symbol-pushing calculations, and, in
addition, the level of abstraction also makes mechanisation and automation tractable [1,17]. One important development
are the modal semirings by Desharnais et al. [12]. A modal semiring is a semiring structure including a domain operator
facilitating the deﬁnition of modal operators in the sense of dynamic logic.
Our intent in this paper is to let yet another stream runup to Segerberg’s unitingwork by viewing some aspects of dynamic
doxastic logic from the point of modal semirings. In this paper, we propose a modal semiring extended with an epistemic-
action operator: a dynamic epistemic semiring. This structure allows us to reason about an agent’s changing beliefs in a
transparent, calculational fashion. The carrier elements of the algebra are viewed as epistemic actions – actions working on
the agent’s beliefs. To check whether the agent believes a proposition we introduce special actions: epistemic tests. Epistemic
tests work like guards in program theory, i.e. programs that check if some predicate holds or not.
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In comparison to the semi-formal approach of the AGM trio, and the logical approaches of Segerberg [24,25,26]; Baltag et
al. [6,5] and the so called Amsterdam school centered around van Benthem [8] and de Rijke [23] – our approach is abstract-
algebraic. The work that comes closest to ours is the elegant algebraic approach to dynamic epistemic reasoning by Baltag
et al. [3,4,7]. But when they use systems (a combination of a complete sup-lattice, a quantale and a right-module structure
on the lattice) as the underlying structure in order to achieve an axiomatisation, we use modal semirings. Baltag et al.’s
approach is perhaps more thoroughly developed to match the original framework by Alchourrón et al. than ours, whereas
our treatment, on the other hand, is more perspicuous in that it has a (at least to our mind) simpler algebraic structure
underneath, and it also easily facilitates iterated action.
The structure of thepaper is: Section2deﬁnesmodal semirings. In Section3, the revisionoperator is introduced. In Section
4, we provide a relational model and in Section 5, we develop a basic calculus. In Section 6, we derive the classical AGM
axioms for revision in the algebra. Section 7 considers an extension with an iteration operator. The ﬁnal section contains
some concluding remarks. Only the most interesting proofs are included in the main text; Appendix A contains detailed
proofs of the remaining claims.
We want to emphasise that the main purpose of this paper is not to consider applications or the philosophy of formal
epistemology, but to lay an initial foundation to using semirings for reasoning about belief in change. The paper, then,
primarily provides a concise technical framework, that connects earlier work on formal epistemic reasoning with the recent
work on applications of semirings. It is an invited extension of an earlier paper [28].
2. Modal semirings
By an idempotent semiring we shall understand a structure over the signature (+, ; , 0, 1) such that the reduct over (+, 0)
is a commutative and idempotent monoid, and the reduct over (; , 1) is a monoid such that ; distributes over + and has 0
as a left and right annihilator. When no risk for confusion arises ;will be left implicit. An idempotent semiring thus satisﬁes
the following axioms (a, b and c in the carrier set):
a + (b + c)=(a + b) + c, (1)
a + b=b + a, (2)
a + 0=a, (3)
a + a=a, (4)
a(bc)=(ab)c, (5)
1a=a = a1, (6)
0a=0 = a0, (7)
a(b + c)=ab + ac and (8)
(a + b)c=ac + bc. (9)
We deﬁne the canonical order ≤ on a semiring by a ≤ b ⇔df a + b = b for all a and b in the carrier set. With respect to the
canonical order, 0 is the least element, ; as well as + are isotone and + is join.
A test semiring [11,20] is a two-sorted algebra
(S, test(S),+, ; ,¬, 0, 1)
such that
• (S,+, ; , 0, 1) is an idempotent semiring,
• (test(S),+, ; ,¬, 0, 1) is a Boolean algebra (BA) and
• test(S) ⊆ S.
Join andmeet in test(S) are thus+ and ;, respectively, and the complement is denoted by¬; 0 is the least and 1 is the greatest
element. We shall use a, b, . . . for general semiring elements and p, q, . . . for test elements. On a test semiring we axiomatise
a domain operator  : S → test(S) by
a ≤ a ; a, (10)
(pa) ≤ p and (11)
(ab) ≤ (ab), (12)
for all a ∈ S and p ∈ test(S) [11]. Inequalities (10) and (12) can be strengthened to equalities. To be explicit, the operator 
binds the strongest, followed in descending order by · and +.
The domain operator satisﬁes stability of tests,
p = p , (13)
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and additivity,
(a + b) = a + b . (14)
Isotony of domain follows from additivity. We will use p → q as a shorthand for ¬p + q. Note that
p → q = 1 ⇔ p ≤ q
follows from shunting. With the aid of the domain operator, we can deﬁne modal operators [12] by
〈a〉p =df (ap) and [a]p =df ¬〈a〉¬p . (15)
Therefore we shall call a test semiring with a domain operator a modal semiring. The diamond can be read “it is possible
to successfully perform a so that p will hold” and the box as “after every successful way of performing a it will be the case
that p holds.”1 The following fact
if p ≤ q and [a]p = 1, then [a]q = 1 (16)
is not hard to prove and will be used later.
Example2.1 (From [11]).Given twobinary relations S, T ⊆  × , deﬁne thebinaryoperators ; and+ and theunaryoperator
 on the relations by the following:
(x, y) ∈ (S; T)⇔df ∃z ∈  • (x, z) ∈ S and (z, y) ∈ T, (17)
(x, y) ∈ (S + T)⇔df (x, y) ∈ S or (x, y) ∈ T and (18)
(x, x) ∈ S⇔df (x, y) ∈ S for some y ∈ . (19)
Moreover, denote the identity relation by , let Ø denote the empty relation and let ¬ denote the complement relative to
. Then the structure
(℘ ( × ),℘(),+, ; ¬,  ,Ø,)
is a modal semiring.
To get a feeling for how the modal operators work, it is helpful to consider the following concrete example.
Example 2.2. Let  = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, let
S = {(1, 2), (2, 2), (2, 5), (4, 3)}
and let
P = {(2, 2), (3, 3)}.
Think of  as a set of states, S as a state-changing action and P as a predicate determining the states 2 and 3. According to
the deﬁnitions in Example 2.1 we then have
〈S〉P = {(1, 1), (2, 2), (4, 4)}
and
[S]P = {(1, 1), (3, 3), (4, 4), (5, 5)}.
Note that both 〈S〉P and [S]P are predicates. It is thus possible to use the action S to reach one of the states prescribed by P
if the action is performed from one of the states 1, 2 or 4; but it is not guaranteed since from state 2 we could also end up
in 5. From the states 1, 3, 4 and 5 we are guaranteed to end up in a state prescribed by P as long as the action is performed
successfully – but from states 3 and 5 there is no successful way of performing the action. 

1 The tests are akin to the tests of propositional dynamic logic and the modal operators are similar to those of that logic. In the tradition following
Dijkstra [13] the box corresponds to the weakest liberal precondition of a with respect to q: if a terminates, p will hold. Our ‘successful’ corresponds to
‘terminating’.
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3. Dynamic epistemic semirings
When reasoning about an agent’s beliefs and changes in the agent’s beliefs a commonway to go is to talk about the agent’s
belief set and operators that work on this set. The classical framework centered around Alchourrón et al. [2] had three such
operators, namely
• expansion: add a belief to the agent’s belief set,
• revision: add a belief to the agent’s belief set and revise the set (without removing the added belief) so that it becomes
consistent, and
• contraction: remove a belief and ensure that it is not implied by the remainder.
In the present paper, we will concentrate on the revision operator – the heart of dynamic epistemic reasoning – but we will
not have anything to say about exactly how the revision is done; what we are saying is that if a revision is done, then some
properties will hold.
It is possible for the agent to be uncertain (or indifferent) regarding some proposition: the agent might not believe a
proposition, but this does not mean that he believes the negation of the proposition either. A certain agent thus believes in
exactly one possible world, so to speak, whereas an uncertain agent possibly does not know exactly in which possible world
(or state) he is in, but only in which subset of possible worlds he is in. For an uncertain agent, if the proposition holds or
does not hold in all the possible worlds in his current belief set, then the agent believes or does not believe the proposition,
respectively. If, however, this subset of possible worlds is a singleton set, then the agent of course knows exactly in which
world he is; Baltag and Sadrzadeh call these sets “complete (fully determined) situations” [7].
We shall now deﬁne ‘dynamic epistemic semiring’, but ﬁrst we provide an informal intuition. The carrier set should be
seen as consisting of actions on the agent’s beliefs and upon these actions we shall work with four operators:
• + is choice: do the left or the right action,
• ; is sequential composition of actions,
• a denotes those states of belief from which it is possible to successfully perform the action a, and
• p revises the agent’s beliefs with p (it is always possible to successfully perform this action, apart from when p is the
contradiction).
We shall have two distinguished actions, the fail (or disaster) action 0 which always fails and the idle action 1 that leaves
everything as it is. The tests (deﬁned according to the test semirings and named et) should be seen as actions that check
whether the agent believes a proposition or not: epistemic tests. If the agent believes the proposition, the epistemic test
will hold and behave like the idle action, otherwise it will behave like the fail action. On epistemic tests ; corresponds to
conjunction and + to disjunction. If a ≤ b the action b results in anything that a would result in and possibly more. The
diamond and the box can be interpreted as above.
We nowpropose a set of axioms for the revision operator. This set is to be seen as amere suggestion, since themain thrust
of this paper is not to promote a particular axiomatisation of revision, but to promote the abstract-algebraic method. These
axioms are chosen because we ﬁnd them reasonable and because the standard AGM axioms for revision follow from them
(see Section 6); depending on one’s needs, another axiomatisation could be chosen and the abstract-algebraic framework
should then work equally well.
Deﬁnition 3.1. A dynamic epistemic semiring (DES) is a two-sorted algebra
D = (D, et(D),+, ; ,¬,, , 0, 1)
such that the reduct structure over
(D, et(D),+, ; ,¬, , 0, 1)
is a modal semiring and : et(D) → D is a unary preﬁx operator such that
p ≤ p, (20)
p;p ≤ p, (21)
p; q ≤ (pq), (22)
(p + q); p =p, (23)
p ≤ q⇒p ≤ q and (24)
p = 1, p /= 0 (25)
hold for any p, q ∈ et(D) when ≤ is the canonical order. 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The operator binds stronger than any of the other operators. One may stress the binding with the aid of parentheses,
although this is not strictly necessary.
An intuition for the axioms can brieﬂy be given as follows. The ﬁrst axiom says that successfully performing a choice
between p andp is equal to successfully performingp. The second axiom says that revising with p and then revising with
p again can be done away with by revising with p just once. The third axiom says that revising with p and then checking that
q holds can be replaced by a revision with the conjunction of p and q.2 If the agent ﬁrst revises his beliefs by the disjunction
p + q and then – with success – checks if p holds this is equal to revising his beliefs with p; this is what the fourth axiom
says. The ﬁfth one says that if a successful execution of a choice between revising with p or q is equal to directly revising
with q then p implies q. The last axiom says that the actionp can always be performed successfully as long as p is not the
contradiction.
4. A relational model for revision
We now give a relational interpretation satisfying the axioms of the above structure. However, we want to emphasise
that this rough relational model is not to be seen as the model for our algebra; it is simply an example of a structure that
satisﬁes our axioms (showing that our axiomatisation has got a model and, so, is sound). It does not do much for intuition.
For example, revision in this model is “absolute” in that all previous knowledge is forgotten when a revision is performed
– this, however, should not follow from the axioms. There are other, more suitable, models for belief revision, but since our
main concern in this paper is the abstract algebra, we shall not go into these. That these more “realistic” models could be
connected with our algebra should follow from the fact that counterparts to the classical AGM axioms can be derived in our
framework (see Section 6).
Example 4.1. Let  be any set and let  be the identity relation. Deﬁne the unary preﬁx operator
 : ℘() → ℘( × )
by, for any given P ⊆ ,
P=df {(x, p) | x ∈  and (p, p) ∈ P}. (26)
Then the structure
(℘ ( × ),℘(), ; ,+,¬,  ,,Ø,)
is a DES when the operators and the constants are interpreted as above and as in Example 2.1. The only axioms that need to
be veriﬁed are those concerning, the rest have been veriﬁed in [11]. The ﬁrst axiom is veriﬁed by
(p, p) ∈ P
⇒ {property of binary relations}
(p, p) ∈ {(x, p) | x ∈  and (p, p) ∈ P}
⇔ {deﬁnition of}
(p, p) ∈ P,
the second by
(x, y) ∈ P;P
⇔ {deﬁnition of ;}
∃z ∈  • (x, z) ∈ P and (z, y) ∈ P
⇒ {deﬁnition of}
(x, y) ∈ P,
the third by
(x, y) ∈ P;Q
⇔ {deﬁnition of ;}
∃z ∈  • (x, z) ∈ P and (z, y) ∈ Q
⇔ {deﬁnition ofP}
∃z ∈  • (x, z) ∈ P, (z, z) ∈ P and (z, y) ∈ Q
⇒ {P, Q ⊆ }
∃z ∈  • (x, z) ∈ P, (z, z) ∈ P ∩ Q and z = y
⇒ {P, Q ⊆ , so P ∩ Q = P;Q}
(x, y) ∈ (P;Q)
2 The inequalities (21) and (22) can in fact be strengthened to equalities.
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the fourth by
(x, y) ∈ (P ∪ Q); P
⇔ {deﬁnition of ; and P ⊆ }
(x, y) ∈ (P ∪ Q) and (y, y) ∈ P
⇔ {deﬁnition of}
(x, y) ∈ P,
the ﬁfth by
P ⊆ Q
⇔ {deﬁnition of}
{(x, p) | x ∈  and (p, p) ∈ P} ⊆ {(x, q) | x ∈  and (q, q) ∈ Q}
⇒ {property of binary relations}
P ⊆ Q
and, ﬁnally,
P
= {deﬁnition of}
{(x, p) | x ∈  and (p, p) ∈ P}
= {deﬁnition of and P /= Ø}

veriﬁes the last axiom.3 

By letting  be ℘(), where  is seen as a set of states (or possible worlds), we get a structure that is closer to common
intuitions. But keep in mind that this, too, is just a rather rough example of a model. (Cf. also Segerberg’s relational – not the
hypertheory – modelling in [25].)
5. A basic calculus
In this section, we develop a basic calculus for DESs. The ﬁrst two propositions are helpful tools.
Proposition 1. In any DES the equations
p; p=p, (27)
p≤p;p and (28)
p; ¬p=0 (29)
hold.
Statement (27) above says that revising the agent’s beliefs by p and then checking whether the agent believes p is equal
to just revising the agent’s beliefs with p. The epistemic test will act as an idle action, since the agent surely believes a
proposition after just having added it. Statement (29) says something similar: after revising with p the epistemic test ¬p
will fail. Statement (28) says that p could always be replaced by p;p. Note, however, that the other direction does not hold,
since revision by pmight result in the agent “losing” information. Having p hold before the revision does not mean that the
revision is idle: the revision might weaken the agent’s beliefs.
The next proposition settles that p is an idempotent element for ; (for any p). This means that repeated revision with
the same predicate has no more effect than revising once.
Proposition 2. In any DES the equation
p;p=p (30)
holds.
Next we establish additivity and isotony of . The intuition is that if the agent is to change his beliefs to a set of states
where p or q hold this is equal to a choice between changing it to a set of states where p holds or changing it to a set of states
where q holds. The intuition behind the isotony is similar to the one of axiom (24).
3 Note thatP = ∇; P, where ∇ is the universal relation. Utilising this fact the derivations can be somewhat simpliﬁed.
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Proposition 3. In any DES the properties
(p + q) =p +q and (31)
p ≤ q⇒p ≤ q (32)
hold.
The following proposition establishes some relations between the constants, the domain operator and the epistemic
operators. As shown by the ﬁrst and the second statement, respectively, revising with the contradiction always fails and this
action cannot be performed.
Proposition 4. In any DES the equations
0=0 and (33)
0=0 (34)
hold.
6. Deriving the AGM axioms for revision
The classical axioms of Alchourrón et al. pertaining to the revision operator can be stated as follows. First, let p and q be
Boolean formulae, let the belief set K be a set of (Boolean) formulae and let * be a binary function from a belief set and a
formula to belief set. Denote the propositional-logic consequence closure {p | PL p} of a set of formulae by Cn(). Then
* is a revision operator if it satisﬁes the following:
K*p = Cn(K*p), (AGM*1)
p ∈ K*p, (AGM*2)
K*p ⊆ Cn(K ∪ {p}), (AGM*3)
If K PL ¬p, then Cn(K ∪ {p}) ⊆ K*p, (AGM*4)
K*p is consistent if PL ¬p, (AGM*5)
K*p = K*q if PL p ↔ q, (AGM*6)
K*(p ∧ q) ⊆ Cn({q} ∪ K*p) and (AGM*7)
If ¬p ∈ K*p, then Cn({q} ∪ K*p) ⊆ K*(p ∧ q). (AGM*8)
To connect our framework to the classical work on belief revision, we now show that the well-known AGM axioms for
the revision operator can be derived in our algebra. First, we encode the axioms following the encoding of the revision
axioms into dynamic doxastic logic (see, for example, Cantwell [9, pp. 39–40]). We refrain from writing out the intuition of
the axioms, but just recall that p → q = 1 ⇔ p ≤ q and note that, informally, p should be seen as Bp in the language of
dynamic doxastic logic and as p ∈ K in the language of AGM, when K is the belief set; [p] should be seen as [*p] in dynamic
doxastic logic and as K*p in AGM theory. Note here a crucial subtlety: when standing alone p corresponds to Bp in dynamic
doxastic logic, but in connection with it is simply p in dynamic doxastic logic.
The AGM axioms for revision are then encoded in our algebra as follows:
[p]p = 1, (*2)
[p]q ≤ p → q, (*3)
¬¬p; (p → q) ≤ [p]q, (*4)
[p]¬0 = 1, when p /= 0, (*5)
[p]r = [q]r, whenever p = q, (*6)
[(pq)]r ≤ [p](q → r) and (*7)
[p]¬¬q; [p](q → r) ≤ [(pq)]r. (*8)
The ﬁrst classical AGM axiom (*1) for revision says that when revising a proposition, the agent should believe all its
consequences. This is taken care of by the underlying epistemic-test structure, and need thus not be stipulated explicitly
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(similarly to dynamic doxastic logic,where it follows from thenormality of the underlying logic). The epistemic-test structure
also entails that the double negations in axioms (*4) and (*8) disappear, and that ¬0 in axiom (*5) equals 1.4
We now derive axioms (*2)–(*8) as calculational derivations in the algebra. The second axiom (*2) can be shown to follow
from the algebra by the calculation
[p]p = 1
⇔ {deﬁnition of box (15)}
¬(p; ¬p) = 1
⇔ {(29)}
¬0 = 1
⇔ {modal semiring properties}
true.
The third axiom (*3) follows from
[p]q ≤ ¬p + q
⇔ {deﬁnition of box (15)}
¬(p; ¬q) ≤ ¬p + q
⇔ {de Morgan}
¬(p; ¬q) ≤ ¬(p; ¬q)
⇔ {stability of tests (13)}
¬(p; ¬q) ≤ ¬(p; ¬q)
⇔ {contraposition}
(p; ¬q) ≤ (p; ¬q)
⇐ {isotony}
p ≤ p
⇔ {axiom}
true,
and the fourth axiom (*4) follows from (*2), the deﬁnition of → and isotony of box (16). The ﬁfth axiom follows from
[p]¬0 = 1
⇔ {deﬁnition of box (15), double negation}
¬(p; 0) = 1
⇔ {axiom}
¬0 = 1
⇔ {stability of tests (13), tests BA}
true,
and the sixth axiom (*6) is a direct consequence of the deﬁnition of box, the isotony of domain and the isotony of revision.
The seventh axiom (*7) follows from the derivation
[(pq)]r ≤ [p](q → r)
⇔ {deﬁnition of box (15), contraposition, de Morgan}
(p; q¬r) ≤ ((pq)¬r)
⇐ {isotony}
p; q ≤ (pq)
⇔ {axiom}
true;
and the derivation
[p]q; [p](q → r) ≤ [(pq)]r
⇔ {deﬁnition of box (15), de Morgan}
¬((p; ¬q) + (p; q; ¬r)) ≤ ¬((pq); ¬r)
⇔ {contraposition, additivity of domain}
((pq); ¬r) ≤ (p; ¬q +p; q; ¬r)
⇔ {axiom, absorption}
((pq); ¬r) ≤ (p; (¬q + ¬r))
⇐ {isotony}
true
shows that the last axiom (*8) follows.
4 The double negation is a dissatisfying consequence following from an attempt to model ¬B¬p (of dynamic doxastic logic) with the aid of tests
represented as a Boolean algebra. As remarked in the concluding section, tests might better be modelled by some other structure – this, however, would
require a different semiring structure altogether and falls outside the aims of this paper.
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7. Iterated action: dynamic epistemic Kleene algebra
To incorporate iterated action intoour frameworkweextend the semiringswithKleene star.5 AKleene algebra is a structure
over (+, ; , ∗, 0, 1) such that the reduct (+, ; , 0, 1) is an idempotent semiring and ∗ satisﬁes the axioms
1 + aa∗ ≤ a∗ , 1 + a∗a ≤ a∗ , (35)
b + ac ≤ c ⇒ a∗b ≤ c and b + ca ≤ c ⇒ ba∗ ≤ c , (36)
for a, b and c in the carrier set [19]. When the semiring reduct has a test set and a domain operator the whole structure is
called a modal Kleene algebra [12].
Deﬁnition 7.1. A dynamic epistemic Kleene algebra (DEKA) is a two-sorted algebra
D = (D, et(D),+, ; , ∗,¬,, , 0, 1)
such that the reduct structure over
(D, et(D),+, ; ,¬,, , 0, 1)
is a DES and the reduct structure over
(D,+, ; , ∗, 0, 1)
is a Kleene algebra. 
A relational interpretation of star is the reﬂexive transitive closure: given a relation R ⊆  ×  we have
R∗ = ⋃
i∈Nat0
Ri,
where R0 =  and Ri+1 = R; Ri. It is easy to see that this interpretation satisﬁes (35) and (36).
Iteration a∗ of an action a should be understood as a repetition of a of any ﬁnite length. Intuitively, repeating p more
than once has no more effect than performing the action once. Indeed, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5. For any test p of a DEKA
p; (p)∗ = (p)∗;p = p (37)
holds.
Proof.We consider the casep; (p)∗ = p, the other case is analogous. For one direction (), we have that
p
= {(6)}
p; 1
 {(4) and deﬁnition of }
p; (p; (p)∗ + 1)
= {(35)}
p; (p)∗
and for the other direction (≤) we use induction
p; (p)∗ p
⇐ {(36)}
p +p;pp
⇔ {(30), (4)}
true,
which proves the proposition. 
5 The classical treatment of iterated belief revision is given by Darwiche and Pearl [10]. Our development is rather different from theirs.
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8. Concluding discussion
This paper takes a modest ﬁrst step towards epistemic reasoning with semirings. It was shown how a revision operator
easily could be embedded into a modal semiring and that, given the proposed axiomatisation of revision, the AGM axioms
can be derived in an elegant and transparent calculational fashion.
One argument that has been raised against this paper is that the relational model presented is too simplistic. This is
certainly a good point if the contents of this sketch is seen as the ﬁnal words on the topic. But if one sees this work as a
precursor to abstract algebras with more elaborate concrete models – and this indeed is the intended view – it becomes
interesting in its own right. It is hoped, that thework presented in this paper could serve as an inspiration formore elaborate
and realistic abstract algebras, much in the same way as Kozen’s partial-correctness algebra [20] served as an inspiration to,
for example, the more elaborate total-correctness algebra of Joakim von Wright [31,32]. How more involved models than
the relational one presented in this paper (such as the hypertheories of the Swedish school [24]) relate to our algebra is thus
an interesting question that one ought to return to. As was the case in vonWright’s move from Kleene algebra to reﬁnement
algebra, this might involve a suitable modiﬁcation of the semiring axioms.
It is also worth asking whether the tests are optimally represented as a Boolean algebra when epistemic reasoning is
concerned. Other natural elaborations are the inclusion of contraction and expansion operators, as well as incorporating
real action (assuming that the beliefs are not a part of the world, real actions are actions on the world) into the framework.
Iteration is only presented very brieﬂy in this paper and one interesting course of action could be to consider different ways
of handling inﬁnite iteration.
Many of the recent abstract-algebraic approaches have proved practical in applications, see, for example, [20,32,21,27];
in an epistemic context, modal semirings have recently been applied byMöller [22]. It is a promising thought that a dynamic
epistemic semiring would prove useful in applications involving epistemic notions. For this purpose, automation along the
lines of Höfner and Struth [17] would be of value.
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Appendix A. Detailed proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
The ﬁrst statement follows from axiom (23) setting q = 0. The second statement follows from epistemic tests being a BA,
isotony of ; and axiom (20). The third statement is proved by
p¬p
= {(27)}
pp¬p
= {epistemic tests BA}
p0
= {0 strict}
0.
Proof of Proposition 2
The statement is proved by
p
= {(27)}
pp
 {(20)}
pp
and axiom (21).
Proof of Proposition 3
The ﬁrst statement (additivity) is proved by
(p + q)
= {(27)}
(p + q)(p + q)
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= {; distributive over +}
(p + q)p +(p + q)q
= {(23) and commutativity of +}
p +q,
the second one (isotony) is straightforward from the ﬁrst.
Proof of Proposition 4
The ﬁrst part is proved by
0
= {(27)}
00
= {0 strict}
0.
The second part follows from the ﬁrst statement and the fact that 0 = 0.
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